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Abstract: We set up a uniﬁed growth model capturing the transition of a
primitive and egalitarian hunter-gatherer society, into an advanced and despotic
early civilization, and ﬁnally into a more egalitarian industrial society. Agents
are either landowners or landless; both earn income from human capital, but only
landowners earn income from land. The central assumption is that the accumula-
tion of human capital increases with the number of people engaged in intellectual
activities, “thinking.” For an agent to be a thinker he must be suﬃciently rich.
At early stages of development, when human capital is scarce, only landowners
can aﬀord to think. Human capital thus grows with the size of the landowning
class. With polygynous mating, rich landowners attract more women than land-
less, and thus have more oﬀspring. This leads to a slow expansion in the size of
the landowning class and thus a gradual increase in the levels of human capital.
At some stage human capital may reach a critical level beyond which also land-
less agents become thinkers. The set a thinkers then suddenly expands, raising
human capital productivity and pushing the economy to sustained growth: an
industrial revolution. Allowing also for a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ in children a
demographic transition sets in. But the economy may also follow a path leading
to the downfall of the civilization, and a slow transition back into an egalitarian
hunter-gatherer state. Which path the economy follows depends on the level of
land productivity. An agricultural revolution is thus a necessary precondition for
a later industrial revolution.
21. Introduction
F o rm o s tp a r to fh u m a nh i s t o r yw eh a v es e e nv e r ys l o wi m p r o v e m e n t si nl i v i n g
standards. It was only a couple of hundred years ago that Western Europe en-
tered an era of sustained growth in per-capita incomes, known as the industrial
revolution. This was associated with equally dramatic demographic changes: ﬁrst
declining mortality, later falling birth rates, and in between a phase of rapid popu-
lation expansion — a process known as the demographic transition. The transition
into sustained growth in living standards seems to have a lot to do with an expan-
sion of knowledge, or human capital, as indicated by the simultaneous increase in
schooling (Matthews et al. 1982, Ch. 4; Galor and Moav 2002b).
The process through which knowledge is created involves research, intellectual
exploration, etc. — for short, call it thinking. For most part of human history
thinking has been the privilege of a small upper class; the poor masses have
rarely had time or energy for intellectual explorations. Not until the introduction
of public schooling did larger sections of society get that opportunity.
We construct a uniﬁed long-run growth model which can explain the industrial
revolution and the demographic transition, and where this class-aspect of human
capital accumulation plays a central role. We let human capital be a public good,
accessible to all. The accumulation of human capital depends on the number of
people engaged in thinking. There is no cost of thinking, but for an agent to be a
t h i n k e rh em u s tb es u ﬃciently rich. There are many ways to model this in more
detail; we could e.g. let thinking be a normal-good activity which agents consume
more of when earning more. But to keep things as simple as possible, we just
postulate that an agent is a thinker if his income exceeds some exogenously given
threshold.
Agents belong to either one of two classes: landowners, or landless. Both earn
income from human capital, but only landowners earn income from land. At early
stages of development, when human capital is low, only landowners (if anyone) can
aﬀord to think. Thus the number of thinkers is given by the size of the landowning
class, and therefore the productivity in human capital accumulation depends on
how many agents belong to the landowning class. A slowly expanding class of
landowners generates gradual increases in the levels of human capital. At some
stage human capital reaches a critical level beyond which also landless agents
3earn above the threshold. The set a thinkers then suddenly comes to include
all agents in the economy. This raises human capital productivity, which in our
model generates sustained growth in human capital: an industrial revolution.
The other crucial ingredient in this story is the force which generates the
expansion in the landowning class. In our model this comes from diﬀerential
reproductive success, meaning that landowners have more oﬀspring than landless.
Again, there are many ways to model this; our approach is to let landowners’
reproductive advantage originate from polygynous mating.1 Consistent with vast
anthropological evidence, in our model rich men attract more women than do
poor men, and thus have more oﬀspring.
S i n c el a n d o w n e r sh a v em o r eo ﬀspring — more sons — this tends to dilute land-
holdings over time, given that not only one son inherits. This is a crucial point
in our story: we know that many historic societies have practiced so-called pri-
mogeniture, i.e., only one son has been allowed to inherit, typically the oldest.
We argue, however, that this is all a matter of degree: there is always some di-
luting eﬀect on landholdings, however small, if the remaining sons are not left
without spoils altogether. We refer to this as imperfect primogeniture,f o rw h i c h
we make both a theoretical and empirical case.2 And, in our model, imperfect
primogeniture is precisely the force which slowly but steadily expands the number
of thinking landowners over time. We let this “leakage” be a constant fraction of
the otherwise non-inheriting sons, but we could also let the split-up of an estate
happen randomly, capturing occasional struggles between rivalling sons.
As the landowning class grows, and more agents become thinkers, the process
leading toward higher levels of human capital sets in, as described above. Since
human capital is identical across classes, this raises the non-land earnings of both
the landless and the landowners. At the same time, however, the income earned
from land by each landowner falls (since each landowner owns less land). If
1Polygyny means that a man can take more than one wife. The more common term polygamy
formally includes polyandry, meaning that also a woman can take more than one husband —
something which is rarely practiced in human societies.
2The theoretical case is made in Appendix A.1, and goes like this: consider a father who
wants to maximize his number of grandchildren, and can split up his estate freely among sons;
in our model he would in fact be indiﬀerent between giving all land to one son, or dividing the
estate equally among his sons — or any combination of the two. His number of grandchildren
would be the same, only born by diﬀerent sons.
4landowners’ incomes (from land and human capital) fall below the threshold for
thinking, all thinkers vanish, and human capital falls to an exogenous minimum
level. This captures the demise of a civilization. The economy thereafter slowly
converges back to an egalitarian hunter-gatherer state. Our model is thus able
to replicate not only a path where the expansion of the landowning class leads
up to an industrial revolution, but also a path where the same process leads to
the downfall of the civilization. More interesting still, which path the economy
follows depends on the level of land productivity; an agricultural revolution is
thus a necessary precondition for a later industrial revolution. This is consistent
with Burkett, Humblet and Putterman (1999), who ﬁnd that the level of pre-
industrial development has a positive impact on an economy’s ability to generate
an industrial revolution.
The model we have described so far contains endogenous fertility, but would
not generate any demographic transition. With children being a normal good,
rising income would lead to rising fertility, and continually accelerating population
growth. To allow for a demographic transition we introduce one more ingredient
into the model: a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ.T o m o d e l t h i s , w e s i m p l y a s s u m e
that parents put higher weight on quality if their own human capital stock is high.
Thus, as human capital growth shoots oﬀ p a r e n t sc h o o s et oh a v ef e w e rc h i l d r e n .
Since they invest more in each child survival rates go up as well. This generates
a short spike in population growth rates, in between the fall in mortality and the
fall in fertility.
Our paper adds to a recent and growing literature on the forces in long-run
development. Some replicate an industrial revolution without any demographics
(e.g. Goodfriend and McDermott 1995 and Hansen and Prescott 2002). Others
emphasize the interaction between the industrial revolution and the demographic
transition (see Lucas 2002, Ch. 5; Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002a;
Lagerl¨ of 2002; Tamura 2001a). In most of these papers, as in ours, endogenous
human capital investments and fertility drive the dynamics.3 However, none of
them analyze the long-run growth implications of diﬀerential reproductive suc-
cess. Moreover, diﬀerent from most of these long-run growth papers, we allow
3These papers in turn build on earlier work by Becker and Barro (1988), Barro and Becker
(1989), and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), who were (among) the ﬁrst to model a quality-
quantity trade-oﬀ in children into an endogenous growth framework.
5for endogenous mortality, following e.g. Jones (2001), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and
Weil (2000), Kalemli-Ozcan (2000), Morand (2000), Lagerl¨ of (2002), and Tamura
(2001b).
Our paper also adds to a literature on polygyny [see e.g. Becker (1976),
Bergstrom (1994a,b), and Guner (1999, Section 5.2)], but none of these stud-
ies growth or tries to explain why polygyny died out. Recent work by Edlund and
Lagerl¨ of (2002) discusses growth and polygyny, but without class diﬀerences, or
diﬀerences in reproductive success.
Lastly, our paper adds to a set of long-run growth models with income in-
equality (e.g. Galor and Moav 2002c). However, no one has yet taken seriously
the long-run growth implications of the fact that intellectual activity was long the
privilege of a small elite.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next, Section 2 outlines a
number of stylized facts we try to explain. Section 3 starts setting up the model,
describing the structure of landholdings and population, budget constraints and
preferences, the concept of thinkers, and the gender dimension of the model.
Section 4 illustrates the dynamics in a phase diagram, and gives some numerical
examples to illustrate the workings of the model. Section 5 ends with a concluding
discussion which goes back to the stylized facts outlined in Section 2.
2. The stylized facts
Our model is able to explain a multitude of empirical regularities. For ease of
exposition, we shall sum these up as seven distinct sets of stylized facts (despite
a certain amount of overlap between them):
Stylized Fact # 1: The Three Regimes. The economic and demographic
history of Western Europe has been described by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) as
passing through three distinct phases, or regimes. These can be identiﬁed in the
diagram in Figure 2.1, which shows the annual growth rates of population and
per-capita income in Western Europe the last millennium. The economy is ﬁrst
situated in a so-called Malthusian Regime, in which population and per-capita
incomes are almost constant, or grow very slowly. Moreover, the relationship
between per-capita income and population growth is positive: small increases in













Figure 2.1: Annual growth rates in Western Europe. Sources: Maddison (1982,
T a b l e1 . 2 ;a n d1 9 9 5 ,T a b l eG ) .T h ey e a r sa r ec h o s e na sm i d p o i n t so ft h ep e r i o d s
reported.
7Figure 2.1 suggests that the Malthusian Regime prevailed in Europe up un-
til the 17th century. Starting around that time, the economy began transiting
into what Galor and Weil call a Post-Malthusian Regime, with simultaneous in-
creases in the growth of both population and per-capita income, indicating that
the relationship between the two was still positive, as in the Malthusian Regime.
The ﬁnal stage of development is the Modern Growth Regime, starting towards
the end of the 19th century. Here per-capita income growth accelerates to even
faster rates than in the Post-Malthusian stage, whereas population growth rates
decline, indicating a negative relationship between the two for the ﬁrst time in
human history.
Our model can replicate all of these three regimes. Moreover, the timing of the
forces driving the population dynamics is consistent with another known empirical
regularity of the demographic transition in many countries. This is our Stylized
Fact # 2: mortality rates fall before birth rates. This seems to be well
documented and not particularly controversial (see e.g. Jones 2001 and Livi-Bacci
1997).
Stylized Fact # 3: long-term changes in equality and monogamy. Ar-
chaeologists identify six “pristine” civilizations on earth: in Mesopotamia, Egypt,
China, India, South America (the Incas), and Mesoamerica (the Aztecs). With
today’s standards, and compared to the hunter-gatherer societies that preceded
them, all these were highly unequal and despotic (Betzig 1993, Nolan and Lenski
1999, Diamond 1999). They were also strongly polygynous, i.e., they had a very
unequal distribution of reproductive resources, women: multiple wives and/or sex
partners was the privilege of the ruling classes (Betzig 1993).
In most societies — whether they tolerate explicit polygyny or not — it is the
richest and most powerful high-status men who have the greatest reproductive
success (Daly and Wilson 1978, Wright 1994, Perusse 1993). Across human soci-
eties measures of polygyny are also positively correlated with measures of despo-
tism and hierarchy (Betzig 1986). In short, more inequality in income and power
should thus imply more inequality in the distribution of reproductive resources
— i.e., more polygyny. The observation that hunter-gatherers are more monoga-
mous can thus be explained by the fact that they have less resources to distribute
unequally, with all men living close to the same subsistence level (Wright 1994,
8p. 94).
Monogamy in modern societies may also be the result of more equality com-
pared to the early civilizations on earth. It seems obvious enough that Western
Europe (and its oﬀshoots) have become more equal over the last couple of mil-
lennia, at least in the distribution of power: witness the birth of democracy, the
abolishment of serfdom, and the egalitarian values associated with the French
and American revolutions. We also have some direct indications of this trend.
Data presented by Campernowne and Cowell (1998, Ch. 3) show that income
inequality in Ancient Rome (about 2,000 years ago) was higher than in Medieval
England (1,000 years ago), which in turn was more unequal than Ante Bellum
America (150 years ago). The same long-term trend appears in British data from
the 1400’s up until today. As we should suspect, Western Europe has also become
more monogamous from the early middle ages and on. Upper class marriages were
often polygynous among the Franks in seventh century. The Carolingians prac-
ticed polygyny in the form of serial monogamy and concubinage; for instance,
Charles the Great (Charlemagne) had ﬁve wives and four concubines (Dickemann
1979, p. 358).
We should note, however, that it is not clear that the shift to monogamy in
Europe was only due to more equality. Alexander et al. (1979 pp. 418-420) de-
ﬁne European monogamy as “socially imposed,” (by the law and/or the church;
cf. Edlund and Lagerl¨ of 2002 and Dickemann 1979), as opposed to monogamy
among hunters-gatherers which is “ecologically imposed.” The question then is
what makes some unequal cultures impose monogamy, and others not. One pos-
sibility, in line with the story we tell here, is that equality had an indirect impact:
imposing monogamy became necessary due to a more equal distribution of power
and income.4 Another way to explain socially imposed monogamy is to allow for
an exogenously given maximum rate of fertility, which plays a role only in very
4In the words of Robert Wright (1994, p. 98): “This explanation of monogamy — as a divvying
up of sexual property among men — has the virtue of consistency with the fact that [...] it is
men who usually control sheerly political power, and men who, historically, have cut most of the
big political deals. This is not to say, of course, that men ever sat down and hammered out the
one-woman-per-man compromise. The idea, rather, is that polygyny has tended to disappear
in response to egalitarian values–not values of equality between the sexes, but equality among
men.”
9unequal societies, where rich men desire a larger number of children. This could
give the upper classes a reason to oppose legally imposed monogamy (see the
concluding discussion in Section 5).
Stylized Fact # 4: 20th century spurt in trend towards equality. The
trend towards more equality accelerated around the 20th century, as the economy
transited into the Modern Growth Regime. Fogel (2000, Ch. 4) presents data
over a number of measures from the 20th century US and Europe, where improved
equality shows up in the Gini ratio for the income distribution; in homelessness;
a n di nc l a s sd i ﬀerences in life expectancy, stature, and weight. The pattern for
the 18th and 19th centuries is more mixed. Two-thirds of the reduction from 1700
to 1973 in the Gini ratio for England took place in the 20th century (Fogel 2000,
p. 143).
Stylized Fact # 5: improved equality driven by diminished role of
agriculture. Fogel’s suggested explanation for the reduction in inequality in the
20th century is also consistent with the mechanism driving our model: “The factor
accounting for most of the reduction that has so far been achieved in the inequality
of the income distribution is the decline in the relative importance of land and
physical capital, and the increasing importance of human capital (labor skills), in
the process of production” (Fogel 2000, p. 157). Notably, Fogel downplays the
importance of e.g. government programs.
Stylized Fact # 6: population is not the whole story. Most earlier
models trying to explain the phenomenon of an industrial revolution focus on
links from population size (or density), via some scale eﬀect, to technological
progress, and economic growth. This is probably important when thinking about
why the industrial revolution happened on the Eurasian continent, rather than in,
say, Australia, or the Americas (see e.g. Kremer 1993). But this does not explain
why growth rates did not spurt in China, or India, where the size and density of
the population exceeded that in Western Europe (see Table 2.1).
Stylized Fact # 7: diﬀerences in inequality and monogamy across re-
gions. Western Europe before the industrial revolution had a more equal income
distribution than had contemporary China and India (Jones 1987 p. 5; Landes
1999 pp. 217-221). This was also reﬂected in the distribution of women: Euro-
pean royal courts around 1500 had no harems, nor any eunuchs assigned to guard
10Europe China India
Population size, millions 81 100 105
Population density, people per km2 8 25 23
Table 2.1: Eurasian population A.D. 1500. Sources: Jones (1987, p. 232), and
McEvedy and Jones (1978, pp. 18, 171, and 183).
them, and did not practice concubinage, as did China well into the twentieth
century (Goode 1963; Mitamura 1970).
India is a harder case to make. Today it is largely monogamous, but the picture
painted by e.g. Dickemann (1979) is that in the 19th century many regions of
India had a more polygynous marriage system than that of contemporary Europe.
In fact, India ﬁts well into the pattern described above: to take more than one
wife was a privilege reserved for the wealthiest and most powerful men. Although
most marriages were between one man and one woman, for a small number of rich
men among the higher castes marriages were often polygynous; men from lower
castes often did not marry at all. This also ﬁts well with the common practice in
India that women marry upwards, to a caste above that in which they were born
(so-called hypergyny), and vice versa for men.
3. The basic structure of the model
Consider the following overlapping-generations model. In every period t there is a
continuum of agents, each living for two periods: childhood and adulthood. Each
individual also belongs to either one of two sexes: male or female. In every period
t there are Pt adult men and equally many adult women. (In the same period
there are also Pt+1 boys and Pt+1 girls living in childhood.)
M e nb e l o n gt oe i t h e ro n eo ft w oclasses: landowners, or rulers, and landless
subjects. In period t there are P R






t = Pt.( 3 . 1 )





.( 3 . 2 )
11The total amount of land in productivity terms is denoted by M. Letting mt





.( 3 . 3 )
3.1. Human capital and income
A landowner’s income is given by
y
R
t = BHt + mt,( 3 . 4 )
where Ht denotes human capital, earning an income of B per unit.
We normalize output per unit of land to one, and mt (recall) denotes land
per landowner. This formulation can be thought of as short-hand for a simple
two-sector model: one sector uses only land, one only human capital, and both
have linear technologies.
As described in Stylized Facts # 5 above, human capital has historically been
more evenly distributed than land. To capture this we here make the extreme




t = BHt.( 3 . 5 )
Human capital of generation t + 1 is built up according to
Ht+1 = AtHt + H.( 3 . 6 )
where At measures human capital productivity, i.e., how well knowledge is accu-
mulated from one generation to the next, and H constitutes the minimum level
of human capital.
3.2. Thinkers
The general idea we want to capture is that knowledge is accumulated through
intellectual activity, which can be performed only by agents who have the luxury
12of not being forced to spend all their time and eﬀort working for their subsis-
tence. One way to model this would be through a time allocation decision be-
tween “thinking” and “working,” made subject to some subsistence consumption
constraint. Only those who have large enough work-free income, and/or agents
who need to work only part time to survive, would be spending time thinking.
To simplify the analysis we instead just postulate that intellectual activity is
performed by agents whose total income exceeds some threshold level, y.C a l l
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In other words, when only landowners’ incomes exceed the threshold, only they
are thinkers; when the income of the landless (and thus also landowners) exceed
the threshold, they are all thinkers; and when not even the landowners’ incomes
exceed the threshold, there are no thinkers.
Next, let human capital productivity, At, be a function of the number of
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where θ,A ∗ > 0; this functional form ensures that At is bounded from above as
the number of thinkers grows indeﬁnitely.
3.3. Budget constraints and preferences
Let variables referring to agents belonging to the landowning and landless classes
be distinguished by the super-index i (i = S,R). Consumption takes place only
in adulthood and class-i consumption is denoted by ci
t, and (recall) a class-i agent
earns yi
t. Moreover, he has zi




t are continuous. Men invest qi
t units of the consumption good in each











t.( 3 . 9 )
Preferences are given by
13U
i














,( 3 . 1 0 )
where β ∈ (0,1) and si
t denotes the survival rate of each oﬀspring.
The exponent ρ(Ht) denotes the weight agents put on the quality (the survival
rate, si
t) of children, relative to quantity, zi
tni
t. W ea s s u m et h a tρ0(Ht) > 0, i.e.,
parents with more human capital put a higher weight on their children’s quality.
3.4. The survival function
The function which determines the survival rate of each child is given by
s
i
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t = 0, i.e., inﬁnite (or zero) quality
investment in children drives the survival rate to 100 % (or zero). The exponential
functional form, together with the logarithmic utility function, will give us nice
closed-form solutions.
3.5. Male behavior
Maximizing utility in (3.10), subject to the consumption budget constraint in
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Using (3.12) and (3.13) we see that
q
i
t = ρ(Ht), (3.14)
i.e., quality investment depends only on the weight on quality in the utility func-
tion, ρ(Ht). This in turn is a function of human capital, which is assumed to be
14the same across classes. Thus, the survival rate is identical across classes, so we
can disregard the index i.
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3.6. Allocation of women
Women choose which man to marry, choosing among all men. We assume that
women simply marry so as to maximize the number of surviving oﬀspring, which
is given by stni
t. [Recall from (3.15) that st is the same across classes.] Using the
budget constraint in (3.9), together with the ﬁrst-order condition in (3.12), and
the optimal choice of qi
t in (3.14), we see that per-woman fertility, ni
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which is increasing in the income of the man, and falling in the number of wives
he has. As a consequence, women simply allocate themselves so as to equalize the
income-per-wife ratio (yi
t/zi
t)a c r o s sm e n . 5 Thus ni
t i st h es a m ea c r o s sc l a s s e s ,s o
we can suppress the subindex i, i.e., nR
t = nS
t = nt.
3.7. Marriage market equilibrium




t , and total supply is given by
the total number of women, which is the same as the total number of men, Pt.
Setting supply equal to demand and using the notation in (3.2) we can write the
marriage market equilibrium as
z
R
t λt + z
S
t (1 − λt) = 1. (3.17)
Next, setting ni
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5This result relates to what anthropologists call the polygyny threshold: in a society with
suﬃcient inequality among men, if the only single man’s income falls below a certain level, a
woman would choose to share a richer man with another woman (Gaulin and Boster 1990, pp.
995-996).
15where the second equality uses the expressions for yR
t and yS
t in (3.4) and (3.5).
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This result can be seen as a special case of Proposition 6 in Bergstrom (1994a).
It tells us that wives per man in each respective class is proportional to how
much the class members’ incomes deviate from the mean. The mean income in
the population is given by the denominators in (3.19) and (3.20), i.e., the sum
of income from human capital, BHt,w h i c hi st h es a m ea c r o s sc l a s s e s ,a n dt h e
m e a ni n c o m ef r o ml a n d h o l d i n g s ,λtmt = M/Pt [see (3.2) and (3.3)]. Note that
the average number of wives is one, which must hold whenever there are equally
many men as women, but since there are only two classes there is no man who
has exactly one wife.
4. Dynamics
4.1. Class dynamics
T h en u m b e ro fm a l eo ﬀspring of landowners is zR
t ntst/2. (Half of the children are
sons, half are daughters.) We assume that the only way to become a member of
the landowning class is to be born into it (and being a man). If landowners have
slow reproduction rates, i.e. if zR
t ntst/2 < 1, the next generation of landowners
will be fewer than the preceding. That is, if the average landowner has less than
one son all sons stay in the landowning class, and PR
t falls over time.
4.1.1. Primogeniture
If zR
t ntst/2 ≥ 1, it is not clear what fraction of the sons should inherit. The
most natural theoretical approach would be to assume that landowners allocate
land among sons in order to maximize their sons’ reproductive success, i.e., the
total number of grandchildren their sons produce. As shown in Appendix A.1,
16it then turns out that the father is indiﬀerent as to how the land is allocated.
Intuitively, concentrating the inheritance to fewer oﬀspring implies higher income
and higher reproductive success for those who do inherit — but, trivially, that
higher reproductive success is allocated to fewer sons. In our model, these eﬀects
cancel: the total number a grandchildren is the same, only reared by diﬀerent
sons.
N o ri si te m p i r i c a l l yc l e a rw h a ti sar i g h ta s s u m p t i o nt om a k eh e r e .Ac o m m o n
guess would probably be that landowners in most historic societies have practiced
perfect primogeniture, meaning that only one son inherited. As a logical conse-
quence, the remaining oﬀspring would move to the landless class. Such extreme
social mobility was rarely observed in early human civilizations. Rather, those of
the ruler’s oﬀspring who did not inherit joined intermediate classes, such as the
military, or bureaucracy; they would rarely be left without any spoils altogether
(Betzig 1993). This is also consistent with the fact that human societies have
evolved in a direction of increased complexity and stratiﬁcation, with a growing
number of classes and levels of government (Nolan and Lenski 1999, Ch. 6). For
that reason, we believe that imperfect primogeniture is a more accurate assump-
tion. Indeed, the implications in our model of imperfect primogeniture diﬀer from
those of perfect primogeniture.
To model imperfect primogeniture in a setting with only two classes we let the
number of landowners in period t+1 be given by the sum of (a) the P R
t legitimate




























t ntst/2 ≥ 1
.( 4 . 1 )
Note that δ = 0 amounts to perfect primogeniture, and δ > 0 to imperfect
primogeniture.
4.2. Population dynamics
Every woman has (ntst)/2 surviving sons, and equally many daughters, so the






Pt.( 4 . 2 )
Setting ni








,( 4 . 3 )
where the second equality uses (3.2) and (3.3) to note that λtmt = M/Pt, i.e.,
average land income equals the total amount of land divided by the total number
of people. As seen, the fertility rate is rising in the average income, BHt +M/Pt,
and falling in the quality preference, ρ(Ht).
Using (4.2) and (4.3), together with the expression for the survival rate, st =















Pt.( 4 . 4 )
4.3. The phase diagram
For the moment, hold human capital productivity ﬁxed, and denote it by A0.W e
begin by deriving the loci along which population and human capital are constant













.( 4 . 5 )
Setting Ht+1 = Ht in (3.6) we see that ∆Ht =0w h e n
Ht =
H
1 − A0.( 4 . 6 )
The dynamics are shown in the phase diagram in Figure 4.1. As seen, there
is a unique globally stable steady-state equilibrium. A one-time increase in the
number of thinkers leads to an increase in human-capital productivity, A0,s h i f t i n g
out the (∆Ht = 0)-locus, thus raising the steady-state levels of population and
human capital.
180 = t H ∆








Figure 4.1: The phase diagram.
19This equilibrium is a temporary steady state, in the sense of Galor and Weil
(2000): it assumes a constant number of agents with incomes above y — i.e., a
constant number of thinkers.
4.3.1. How the number of thinkers evolve
The number of thinkers can increase for three reasons. First, it can increase due to
the very creation of a landowning class, e.g. following an increase in agricultural
productivity, M, the fruits of which are concentrated to a small enough fraction of
the population to lift their incomes above the threshold, y. This would correspond
to the agricultural revolution 10,000 B.C. and the resulting establishment of the
ﬁrst cities and civilizations on earth.
The landowning class can also grow in size due to its greater reproductive
success, if primogeniture is imperfect (δ > 0).
Finally, the number of thinkers can expand if the landless class reaches an
income above the threshold y. This could correspond to the introduction of public
schooling.
4.3.2. A hunter-gatherer society
Consider ﬁrst a society with low productivity of land, M, and evenly distributed
landholdings. This could be a society without property rights to land — a hunter-
gatherer society — implying that all men in eﬀect belong to the landholding class:
PR
t = Pt. If human capital is low, no man has an income above the threshold level
for thinking, i.e., BHt + M/Pt < y. Thus there are no thinkers in the economy
(Xt = 0) and human capital productivity, given by (3.7), is zero. Human capital
is thus stuck at H, and the associated steady-state level of population, which we
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20which holds for low enough H and/or high enough y.
Note that increased agricultural productivity leads to larger population but
not higher per-capita income in steady state.
4.3.3. Early civilizations
If M becomes high enough, and/or if a small enough fraction of the population
establishes property rights to the land, the income of each landowner rises above
the threshold: the class of landowners becomes a class of thinkers. This captures






which always holds for a suﬃciently small landowning class (ensuring that M/PR
t
is large enough). These early civilizations always have more human capital than
hunter-gatherer societies.
With imperfect primogeniture (δ > 0) the landowning class will grow over
time. To landowners, this has two eﬀects pulling in opposite directions: (1)
landowner income falls since each agent has less land (M/PR
t is lower); and (2)
landowners and landless alike earn more, since more thinkers implies higher human
capital productivity, and more human capital for all.
This can be seen by using (3.6) and (3.8) to derive an expression for the
temporary steady-state level of human capital as a function of the number of
thinkers. For the moment set the number of thinkers, Xt, equal to the landowning
population, P R





H(θ + P R
t )
θ − PR
t [A∗ − 1]
,( 4 . 1 0 )
w h e r ew ea r ea s s u m i n gt h a tA∗ > 1, implying that H0(PR
t ) > 0. This also implies
that suﬃciently many thinkers would generate sustained growth in human capital
[see (3.8) again], i.e., H(PR
t ) →∞as PR
t → θ/[A∗ − 1].
Using (4.10), together with (3.4) and (3.3), we can write the (temporary
steady-state) landowner income as a function of the number of landowners:
21Figure 4.2: Income levels for landowners (yR
t ) and landless (yS
t ) in the temporary










.( 4 . 1 1 )
We also recall that the ﬁrst term in (4.11) constitutes the income of the landless:
yS
t = BH(P R
t ). Figure 4.2 shows how income of the two classes depend on PR
t ,
for two levels of land, M. The landless’ income is monotonically increasing, and
that of the landowners is U-shaped. The ﬁgure also displays the threshold for
thinking, y. The parameter values are chosen as in Table 4.1 (see explanation
below).
4.3.4. A path to an industrial revolution and a demographic transition
Consider ﬁrst the case with a high level of land productivity, M =2 .75. In
this case, landowner income always exceeds the threshold. With more thinking
landowners there comes a point in time when also the income of the landless ex-
ceeds the threshold, turning the landless class into thinkers and (if total population
22is large enough) raises human-capital productivity above one, thus pushing the
economy onto a sustained growth path. In other words, the economy experiences
an industrial revolution.
We can also understand this process in terms of Figure 4.1: a slowly rising
number of thinkers ﬁrst shifts out the (∆Ht = 0)-locus, little by little. At some
point in time the locus passes the critical level B/y,t h ep o i n ta tw h i c hn o n -
land income exceeds the threshold, and the economy goes through an industrial
revolution.
As human capital starts growing, the weight on quality, ρ(Ht), rises. This
leads to a quality-quantity shift in children: a fall in mortality and — with a slight
lag — fertility, with an associated spike in population growth in between. The
way we have drawn the phase diagram in Figure 4.1 explains why. Note that
the (∆Pt = 0)-locus becomes asymptotically horizontal, implying that population
b e c o m e sc o n s t a n ti nl e v e l sa sh u m a nc a p i t a lg o e st oi n ﬁnity. (This need not be
the case, but it holds for e.g. the numerical example in Table 4.1.) Since sustained
growth in human capital pushes mortality to zero [recall (3.15)] the new constant
population level must be associated with a lower rate of fertility: a demographic
transition must has taken place.
4.3.5. The downfall of an early civilization
With low land productivity, M =1 .75, the diluting eﬀects of a growing landown-
ing class will at some stage push landowners income below the threshold, at which
all thinkers vanish and human capital falls to its minimum, H: the civilization
goes under. From there on, population slowly approaches the long-run hunter-
gatherer level, given in (4.7). Since landowners still have higher incomes, and
thus higher reproductive success, the landowning class keeps growing, so that
eventually all agents become landowners.
4.4. Numerical simulations
To understand better how the diﬀerent components of the model interact we
next demonstrate two simple numerical simulations. The ﬁrst shows an economy
experiencing an industrial revolution; the other shows an economy collapsing (and
23B β k1 k2 M θ A∗ H y PR
0 H0 P0 δ
5 .99 2 4.995 2.75 12 30 1 20 .05 1.14 0.44 .005
Table 4.1: Parameter values
thereafter slowly converging back to a hunter-gatherer society). We do not try to
ﬁt the model to any numerical data.
We ﬁrst need to specify a functional form for the quality-preference function,
ρ(Ht):
ρ(Ht)=k1 + k2Ht,( 4 . 1 2 )
where k1,k 2 > 0.
The parameter values are chosen (largely arbitrarily) as in Table 4.1. We
choose the values for k2, β,a n dB so that the fertility rate in (4.3) converges to
two as human capital goes to inﬁnity, i.e., we set k2 = Bβ/2. Since the survival
rate goes to unity [see (3.15)], each couple having two surviving children implies
a constant population.
Given these parameter values, we let the initial number of landowners, P R
0 ,b e
.05. As seen from Figure 4.2 (which uses the same parameter values) landowner
income thus exceeds the threshold, ensuring that the economy starts oﬀ with a
positive number of thinkers. The initial level of human capital is calculated from
(4.10); then initial population can be derived from (4.5). We can calculate the
initial fraction of the population who are landowners, λ0,a s.05/.44 ≈ 11%.
Given these initial values we then simulate the path the economy follows over
time. Since δ > 0 the landowning class grows over time — see (4.1) — which sets
the dynamics in motion as described above. The path referring to the values in
Table 4.1 is shown in Figure 4.3; Figure 4.4 then shows the eﬀects of a lower M.
4.4.1. An industrial revolution
Figure 4.3 displays the time path when M =2 .75. The diagram in the upper
left corner illustrates the levels of income for both classes. At the very point in
time when income of the landless class comes to exceed the threshold both classes’
incomes shoot oﬀ into sustained growth, as human capital productivity jumps up
when all agents become thinkers. Higher levels of human capital also generate a
sharp fall in mortality, and — with a slight lag — fertility, as shown in the upper
24right diagram.6 In between, the growth rate of population leaps up, as seen in
the lower left diagram.7 At the same time growth in per-capita income (i.e., the
change in BHt+M/Pt) jumps up and then stabilizes at a sustained positive rate.
4.4.2. The downfall of a civilization
Consider next the same economy, but with lower land productivity: M equal to
1.75, instead of 2.75. As seen from Figure 4.2 this means that at some point in
time landowner income falls below the threshold, implying that all thinkers vanish.
Human capital drops to H and stays there forever. As a result, the mortality rate
rises. So does the fertility rate, due to a reversed quality-quantity switch following
the fall in human capital, a sort of reversed demographic transition. In between
there is a sharp dip in population growth to negative numbers.
At the new stable levels of population and human capital the landowning class
is still growing, and the landless class is shrinking, due to the higher reproductive
success of the landowners and the assumption of imperfect primogeniture. In the
long-run the economy thus converges to an equal hunter-gatherer state in which
all agents are landowners.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a model which is able to explain a number of empirical regu-
larities in the long-run development of human societies. We listed these as seven
stylized facts in Section 2. Going back we can now point to exactly how our model
replicates each fact.
To see how our model explains Stylized Fact # 1 — Galor and Weil’s (1999,
2000) Three Regimes — consider the phase diagram in Figure 4.1 again. At a
given level of human capital productivity, A0, the economy gravitates toward a
Malthusian-Regime type of stable equilibrium. Over time, as the landowning
6The fertility rate is calculated as nt/2 − 1. (This would be the population growth rate if
all children survived; the mother dies after the adult phase and she has nt/2d a u g h t e r s . )T h e
mortality rate is calculated as 1 − st. Note that population is constant when stnt/2=1 ,s o
nt/2 − 1 need not equal 1 − st when population is constant.
7There is an increase in the vertical distance between the fertility and mortality curves around
generation 600, but it is hard to see.
25Figure 4.3: A path leading to an industrial revolution and a demographic transi-
tion.
26Figure 4.4: A path leading to the demise of an early civilization.
27class expands, human capital productivity increases. This makes the (∆Ht =0 ) -
locus shift out, generating higher levels of population and human capital. As the
(∆Ht = 0)-locus passes the threshold, B/y, landless agents become thinkers. This
raises human capital productivity, pushing the economy to sustained growth in
human capital. As human capital starts growing parents shift from quantity of
children to quality, due to the higher utility-weight on quality, ρ(Ht). This leads
to a fall in both mortality and fertility, but the fall in fertility comes a little later
because higher incomes have a demand eﬀect on children. Population growth thus
shoots up temporarily (cf. Figure 4.3), implying a short phase of simultaneously
increasing income and population growth — a Post-Malthusian Regime. As popu-
lation growth falls again, human capital and income keep growing at a sustained
rate — a Modern Growth Regime.
As noted, the mechanism driving the temporary rise in population growth is
the slight lag between the fall in mortality and the fall in fertility, so the model
also ﬁts with Stylized Fact # 2.
Stylized Fact # 3 is at the center of the model: diﬀerences in the number
of wives men can take reﬂect diﬀerences in income. A completely monogamous
society in our model would be either (A) a society where landholdings are dis-
tributed equally, which we can think of as a society without property rights to
land — a hunter-gatherer society; or (B) a society with very high and growing
levels of human capital, so that earnings from human capital (here assumed to be
completely equal) dwarf earnings from land — which essentially is the society we
live in today. Polygynous societies are those where land represents a large share
of earnings for the landowning class, and land is concentrated to very few agents.
Thus, a shift to sustained growth in human capital is associated with increased
equality; a rise in equality should arrive around the same time as incomes start
growing at sustained rates — which is our Stylized Fact # 4. The reason is that
we have assumed human capital to be completely equal across men, which is a
caricature of Stylized Fact # 5. (Needless to say, in the real world no measure of
human capital would be completely equally distributed; the point is that human
capital is more equal than landholdings.)
Our model can also account for Stylized Fact # 6, if we assume exogenous
diﬀerences in land productivity between China and India on the one hand, and
28Europe on the other. In our model, a society with higher land productivity, M,
will have a larger population in its temporary steady state. [To see this, note from
( 4 . 5 )t h a tar i s ei nM shifts up the (∆Pt = 0)-locus in Figure 4.1.] At the same
time, the level of human capital in the temporary steady state depends only on
the number of thinkers — i.e., the number of agents in the landholding class — and
not on their incomes (as long as their incomes lie above the threshold). Thus, a
society with a rich but small ruling class — like China or India — is less likely to
experience an industrial revolution than is a society with a larger ruling class, but
with smaller income gaps — like Europe.
Since the degree of polygyny — as measured by the diﬀerence in the number
of wives between classes — is the mirror image of the income gap between classes,
the assumption of diﬀerent land productivity between China/India and Europe
would also explain diﬀerences in marriage systems, i.e. Stylized Fact # 7.
As discussed in the context of Stylized Fact # 3, monogamy need not be the
outcome of income equality. Europe and parts of Asia practice so-called socially
imposed monogamy, i.e., the rule of one-man-one-wife is imposed an all men, even
though the societies are strongly hierarchical and stratiﬁed. Quite surprisingly, in
our model such imposed monogamy would not change any of the results. To see
this, set zi
t = 1 in (3.16); diﬀerential reproductive success then still prevails, but
is reﬂected not in the number of wives but in the number of children per wife, ni
t.
With imperfect primogeniture, the slow expansion in size of the landowning class
is operative, so all our results still go through.
However, with such a reformulation we would not be able to explain the men-
tioned diﬀerences in marriage forms over time and across societies. But one addi-
tional assumption would enable us to endogenously replicate a shift from polygyny
to socially imposed monogamy: let there be some upper limit to the number of
c h i l d r e naw o m a nc a nb e a r ,n say. Consider a society with a very small and rich
landowning class, so that the landowners’ desired number of children exceeds n.
Then landowners would insist to be allowed to take more than one wife; polyg-
yny would be necessary for landowners to be able to reach their desired rate of
reproduction. In a society where landowners are not so rich their desired number
o fc h i l d r e ni sl e s st h a nn. Then landowners would not object to monogamy, since
they need only one wife to reach their desired number of children. Assume next
29that the landowning class can veto any such law; then our model could generate
an endogenous shift from polygyny to such socially imposed monogamy at the
very point in time when the landowners’ desired number of children falls below n.
A. Appendix
A.1. Indiﬀerence to primogeniture
Let πt denote the fraction of the zR
t ntst/2 sons who inherit land; the remainder
get nothing. Perfect primogeniture — meaning one son inherits — would thus
correspond to πt =1 /[zR
t ntst/2]. Since we have a continuum of sons, however, we
can allow for the case where less than one son inherits (as long as πt > 0).
Without loss of generality, let those sons (or the son) who inherits receive the
same amount of land. The father owns mt units of land, so those sons who inherit
each earns an income of
y
R





in the next period. Those who inherit nothing earn
y
S
t+1 = BHt+1. (A.2)
Next, recall that children per wife, nt+1, is the same across classes [see (4.3)]. Using
the expressions for the number of wives of landowners and landless in (3.19) and
(3.20), forwarded one period, we see that the total number of grand children is



































30which is clearly independent of πt. Thus, the landowner is indiﬀerent as to how
πt is set and how the land is split up between sons.
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